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ABSTRACT 
The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses 
on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA 
safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and 
developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA 
C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, 
nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate 
autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These 
systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, 
reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past 
experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, 
and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities 
include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, 
numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies 
tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring 
system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera 
systems, and support of the IAEA’s development of the universal nondestructive assay data 
acquisition platform. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarizes the United States Support Program (USSP) Containment and Surveillance 
(US) priority. The main objective of this priority is to improve the capabilities, reliability, and 
cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for unattended and remotely monitored use. IAEA requests 
applicable to this priority are sealing systems, containment systems, vulnerability assessments, 
video surveillance, equipment factory maintenance, workshops, unattended monitoring, remote 
monitoring, cost free experts (CFE), junior professional officers (JPO), and nondestructive assay 
(NDA) hardware/software. The USSP provided over $4 million funding, in 2007, for more than 
forty projects under this priority. The Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support and the 
International Safeguards Project Office established priority statements to allow the USSP to more 
effectively categorize IAEA requests, to establish strateges to address these requests, and for goals 
to measure performance on an annual basis. 
2. C/S GENERAL. DISCUSSION 
Many of the IAEA’s C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may 
include seals, instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. Increasingly, these systems operate 
autonomously and send analytical data to IAEA headquarters. These systems present challenges to 
the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, 
documentation, and cost effectiveness. The individual containment and surveillance subsystems are 
evolving continually as well. One critical lesson from past product development experiences is the 
need for cooperation and common objectives among the MEA, the developer, and the facility 
operator, to create a successful, cost-effective system. The USSP ensures IAEA and commercial 
entity participation in the design review of the product prototype, prior to commercialization, in 
product development projects. This gives the IAEA the opportunity to ensure that the prototype 
meets their needs. It lets the commercial entity provide input to the developer, so that the product 
can be commercialized effectively, to maximize reliability and cost effectiveness. 
Containment strategies are vital to ensuring that IAEA safeguarded facilities (including equipment 
and storage areas) have not been compromised by a break in the continuity of knowledge (CoK). 
These strategies are most often satisfied through the use of tamper indicating devices, such as seals. 
Most of the IAEA’s seals have been in use for many years. Some seals are being upgraded or 
replaced, with the intent of reducing vulnerability and increasing the ability to verify the seal either 
in situ or remotely. New concepts which have not been implemented yet are the use of the intrinsic 
properties of a container, or building it to make it tamper resistant, or by incorporating tamper 
indicating mechanisms into the container or building design. 
Video surveillance has long played a critical role in maintaining CoK on safeguarded nuclear 
material, to avoid the need for frequent re-measurements that would otherwise be needed to detect 
certain diversions. There are longstanding problems of system reliability and occasional 
performance problems, which cause anomalies that are difficult to resolve. 
NDA related work includes all equipment and software from the instrument making the 
measurement, processing this information, and presenting the data to the inspector. NDA hardware 
and software require upgrades continually to present data more effectively to the inspectors to 
minimize their workload, especially during on-site inspections. NDA equipment has focused on the 
detection of gamma ray and neutron sensors, due to the ability to identify and quantify most forms 
of nuclear material. NDA systems are evolving continually to keep pace with the improvements in 
sensors and electronics and to address the changing requirements of nuclear materials and facilities. 
UI  
The USSP supports the development and implementation of technologies for increasing the number 
of standardized containment and surveillance systems operating in unattended and remotely 
monitored configurations. Associated challenges are the reduction in the number of unique types of 
equipment and regular updating and verification of system documentation for inspectors and 
maintenance staff. In the near future due to the expected nuclear renaissance, safeguards will have 
to address the growth of complex fuel cycle facilities under integrated safeguards, the spread of 
nuclear power stations to new states and, very likely, the monitoring of facilities in states of IAEA 
interest. All of these will require the continued use of C/S systems. The continuing demands on the 
IAEA to implement more effective safeguards subject to constrained resources will require 
technical solutions that do not come with a considerable maintenance cost. 
Integrated safeguards involve less frequent, randomized inspections. These inspections are 
ineffective unless they are coupled with unattended and remotely monitored equipment to maintain 
CoK, requiring extremely reliable and easily maintained C/S equipment. 
Complex and sensitive fuel cycle facilities will likely require combinations of C/S devices working 
together with radiation monitors and other sensors, possibly for joint use by the State and the IAEA. 
The spread of power reactors to a wide spectrum of States requires surveillance systems that 
provide clear information regarding spent fuel pool operations. These systems will need to be 
designed to tolerate ambient radiation levels, to work in poor lighting conditions, to operate with 
radiation and other sensors, to provide high resolution-images based on a number of triggering 
modes, and to operate for long periods of time with extremely high reliability. 
3. PRIORITY STRATEGIES 
The USSP priorities were written to document the policy and guidelines of the USSP. When 
determining the acceptance of an IAEA request, the SSTS considers whether it is addressed by the 
USSP priorities. Each USSP priority contains implementation strategies. The C/S priority 
included NDA, prior to submittal of the abstract for this paper. The USSP has created a separate 
priority for NDA recently. The author has decided to include the NDA priority in this paper. The 
strategies for the C/S and NDA priority are: 
1) to support the implementation of improved C/S systems, which increase the inspectors’ 
efficiency and ability to perfom effective C/ S safeguards, 
2) to support the development of C/S systems, including advancements in system performance, 
standardization, reliability, and cost-effectiveness, 
3) to support the maintenance and improvement of existing sealing and containment systems, 
4) to support the implementation of improved NDA systems, which increase the inspector’s 
efficiency and ability to draw accurate safeguards conclusions, 
5) to support the development of NDA systems, including advancements in system performance, 
standardization, reliability, and cost-effectiveness, and 
6) to support the maintenance and improvement of existing NDA systems. 
3.1 PRIORITY TACTICAL GOALS 
Each priority has a number of tactical goals which address priority strategies. Each tactical goal 
contains a list of performance measures. The performance measures list activities which are 
expected to be accomplished in the following year. Each year, the USSP evaluates the results of the 
previous year’s performance measures. The tactical goals for this priority, brief descriptions of 
some active projects, and pending requests applicable to each are provided below. 
3.1.a Continue support for the development of the Next Generation Surveillance System 
(NGSS) 
The IAEA is developing NGSS to replace the digital camera module (DCM-14) video surveillance 
systems. The USSP has provided funding for the development of NGSS, under task E.137, which 
includes a consultant to assist the IAEA with project management. The DCM-14 was first 
implemented for safeguards use in 1998. After ten years of reliable performance, the DCM-14 is 
nearing the end of its lifecycle, with critical components disappearing from the market and more 
advanced components becoming commercially available. The IAEA plans on retiring the DCM-14 
as soon as NGSS development and production are complete. [z] NGSS is designed to cover the 
future IAEA surveillance needs for both current and new safeguards verification regimes. The 
development of NGSS is divided into four phases, to facilitate effective and efficient project 
management and to allow for phased funding. These phases are: 
1) conceptual design, 
2) detailed design, 
3) prototype development, and 
4) prototype construction and testing. 
Phases 1 and 2 have been completed. Phase 3 is near completion. [3] 
3.1.b Continue manufacturer factory support for the Digital Imaging System (DIS), the 
Server Digital Imaging System (SDIS), and the General Advanced Review Software (GARS) 
The USSP provides funding for manufacturer factory support to the IAEA for GARS (subtask 
E.119.01), DIS (task E.133) and SDIS (task E.133). These tasks allow the IAEA to receive quick 
manufacturer responses to requested essential software and hardware upgrades. GARS provides a 
flexible and user friendly inspector interface for the review of images from numerous types of 
hardware. GARS has advanced features, which can be used to reduce an inspector’s review effort. 
Some of these features include image and data authentication verification, image and data 
decryption, scene change detection of recorded digital images, digital enhancement, and multiple 
camera display options. SDIS was developed initially for remote monitoring applications. Its 
primary fimction is the collection of images and data from multiple DCM-14 surveillance cameras. 
It may also be used for the direct interrogation of certain IAEA seals. The system is designed to 
collect various forms of data, such as instrumentation, video, trigger, and environmental. The SDIS 
server sorts and classifies this data and has the capability to transfer images and data to IAEA 
headquarters securely. [4] 
3.l.c Continue support for the future development of sealing/containment and surveillance 
systems to increase performance, increase security, reduce inspector workload, and reduce 
costs 
The USSP continues to fund requests under this tactical goal. Task E.158: “Testing of Secure 
Satellite Communication for Remote Monitoring Inspection Support” provides an information 
technology expert, who will perform a vulnerability assessment of a remote monitoring test system 
using satellites. The IAEA would like to use this system to reduce remote monitoring operating 
costs and improve system performance. Subtask E. 122.19: “Equipment Security Technical 
Support” provides assistance to the IAEA on an as needed basis. An equipment security expert has 
assisted the IAEA with the training of a staff member and with project technical reviews, including 
the completion of outstanding equipment security related tasks. Task E.140: “Enhancement of the 
Cobra Fiber Optic Seal System” is improving the usability, and reducing the vulnerability, of the 
COBRA sealing system used by IAEA inspectors. Both the fiber optic seal and seal reader are 
being redesigned. The IAEA has submitted a request recently for an additional phase of this project 
to allow the new COBRA seal reader to also interrogate the electronic optical sealing system 
(EOSS) seals. Task E.150: “Development of a Conduit Monitoring System” provides for tamper 
detection of IAEA conduit and hardware, which is installed at safeguarded facilities. The USSP is 
evaluating requests from the IAEA including: “Reflective Particle Tags for the Verification of 
Welds,” “Development of a Remotely Monitored Sealing Array,” and the “Phase 5 of the 
Enhancement of the Cobra Fiber Optic Sealing System.” 
3.1.d Continue support for modernization and increased tamper resistance of the metal 
sealing system 
The USSP has provided funding for the MEA Metal Seal Modernization project. A national 
laboratory is developing an instrument capable of detecting the tampering of the two types of IAEA 
metal seal wires, under task E.144. The performance of the prototype instrument has been 
documented by experiments, which provide estimates of the probabilities of failing to detect a 
tampered wire and misclassifying a non-tampered wire. This instrument will allow for a more 
thorough verification of metal seal wire integrity during IAEA inspections. 
3.1.e Continue support for the development and maintenance of facility specific sealing 
systems 
Task E.147: “Material Management System (MMS) Software Update” involves the upgrade of the 
MMS software used at the K-Area Material Storage facility in Savannah River. This system is used 
in conjunction with two-way radio frequency seals (TRFS), to provide containment of special 
nuclear material stored under international safeguards. The TRFS seal data is provided to the IAEA 
via remote monitoring. The USSP is waiting for the IAEA to submit a revised scope of work for 
this software upgrade, based on the results of the March 2008 Task Review meeting in Vienna. 
3.1.f Continue support for containment verification requests 
Task E.146: “Change Detection Software (CDS) Applied to a Containment Verification 
Application” involves the use of CDS technology to assist in tamper detection of equipment and 
facility containment. A national laboratory is in the process of submitting a video to the IAEA to 
demonstrate how CDS can be used for containment verification at safeguarded facilities. Funding 
can be requested from the USSP for continuation of this task, after the IAEA evaluates this video. 
3.1.g Continue support for vulnerability assessments @‘A) and advanced concepts related to 
the development of sealing and containment systems 
The USSP continues to support MEA requests for VAS of equipment and systems. The USSP has 
two active tasks at present. Task E.154 involves a VA on the upgraded ultra sonic sealing bolt 
(USSB), developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre located in Ispra, Italy. The 
ECJRC USSB upgrade uses multiple independent, but spatially related, unique identity elements, 
which makes the bolt difficult to counterfeit. The new system reads the unique identify elements, 
using an ultrasonic transducer, and compares the spatial relationships between them. Task E.145 
involves a VA of the IAEA adhesive seal. This task provides for the VA of the existing adhesive 
seal and input, with respect to vulnerability mitigation, on the design of the new adhesive seal under 
development by a private contractor. 
3.1.h Continue providing professional technical support (CFE/JPO) for remote monitoring 
and sealing/containment activities 
The USSP funds CFE and JPO requests to provide assistance to the IAEA for CIS. A CFE is 
providing technical assistance to the Seals Unit, under task E.148. The CFE’s work includes 
containment verification, sealing systems development, vulnerability countermeasures training 
development, and evaluations of vulnerability assessments. Another CFE is providing technical 
assistance to the Remote Monitoring Unit. The CFE’s work includes overseeing the integration of 
surveillance, unattended radiation monitoring, and remote monitoring systems. The USSP provided 
subject matter experts and a facilitator for the 2007 Seals Workshop, held at the IAEA, in February 
2007, under task S.079. The workshop participants included experts from government, academia, 
and private industry. They offered recommendations to assist the IAEA to field the most effective 
and secnre sealing and containment verification systems. 
3.1.i Continue to support existing NDA systems including hardware and software 
After funding the development of NDA software and hardware systems, the USSP has supported 
the extensive maintenance and upgrading of these systems. The USSP interprets NDA related work 
to include all equipment from the instrument making the measurement, the equipment processing 
this information, and all software that receives the data and presents the data to the inspector. A 
few active projects are provided below with a brief description. 
The unattended and remote monitoring (UNARM) software is updated periodically. The UNARM 
software processes data from nuclear safeguards instruments, evaluates the data, and presents it to 
the inspector in a format to minimize inspector effort in determining nuclear safeguards 
conclusions. This software allows for a more comprehensive review of the data by the inspector, 
which would not ordinarily be possible due to time constraints. In response to an IAEA request, the 
current UNARM software upgrade (subtask E. 122.20) includes the capability of addressing the 
Electro Optical Sealing System (EOSS) in unattended mode (subtask E. 122.21) and increased 
functionality of the Digital Video Review (DVR) software. The DVR software processes pictures 
from safeguarded facility cameras. 
The USSP funded the development and commercialization of the mini gamma ray and neutron 
detector (MiniGFUND), under task A.242. The MiniGRAND is used by the MEA primarily for 
measuring and monitoring gross gamma rays and neutrons. This instrument can be used in the 
unattended mode. The following work is in progress, or has been recently completed, in support of 
this instrument: new shift register, master processor upgrade, and diagnostic testing including 
service. 
The USSP is funding, under task A.267, the upgrade of the In Situ Object Counting System 
(ISOCS), planned for use in safeguards applications for the quantification of nuclear material by 
passive gamma spectrometry, with a particular focus on nuclear waste and nuclear material hold up 
measurement applications. This task is divided into three phases: 
1) improve functionality and understanding, 
2) improve accuracy of URu measurements, and 
3) Advanced ISOCS (A-ISOCS) software upgrade. 
Phase I has been completed. Phase 2 is in progress at present. This project will result in the 
development of a new software code, which will provide the IAEA with the capability to assess 
more accurately, and within specifically evaluated modeling uncertainties, the quantity of nuclear 
material present in nuclear waste and/or hold-up assays. The successful implementation of an A- 
ISOCS capability will improve the reliability of ISOCS calibrations for safeguards verification. It 
will reduce the work load of IAEA experts who presently provide support to inspectors for the 
determination of nuclear safeguards conclusions from ISOCS data. 
The USSP is supporting the “Sustainability and Maintenance of Software for Pu-Isotopics and U- 
Enrichment,” under task A.274. The US.  Department of Energy has two action sheets which are 
evaluating NDA software codes with a very similar scope to this task. The results of these action 
sheets may be used by the IAEA to plan a strategy for addressing this task. 
3.1.j Support the development of new NDA systems which increase the accuracy of nuclear 
conclusions and minimizes the workload on inspectors 
The USSP has funded the development of a prototype NDA detector, under task A.258, with the 
intended capability of in situ reverification of the nuclear material inventory inside dry storage 
casks (both concrete and metal) in the event of loss of CoK. Presently, IAEA relies on C/S after 
verifying the material during initial loading into the storage casks. This detector can be used to 
make an in situ initial nuclear measurement of a cask. This initial measurement can be compared to 
a future measurement to reverify the container contents, in the event of a future loss of continuity of 
knowledge. The prototype detector has been produced. Field testing on spent fuel casks is ongoing. 
The IAEA has indicated that the universal NDA data acquisition platform (UNAP) will be the next 
generation data acquisition system for IAEA attended and unattended NDA. The MEA plans on 
using UNAP for safeguards at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited mixed oxide (JMOX) fuel fabrication 
plant. The USSP has funded subject matter experts and a consultant, under task E.157, to assist the 
IAEA in preparing the user requirements for issuing an invitation to bid for the development of 
UNAP. The IAEA has estimated the cost of developing UNAP to be $1.5 million. The USSP is 
considering a decision to support the development of UNAP, due to its potential impact on projects 
already funded by the USSP. The USSP has requested that the IAEA provide additional 
information on the cost of the UNAP project and on how it will be integrated with the IAEA NDA 
equipment development and deployment strategy, in order to facilitate a timely decision. This 
information should provide the USSP with sufficient detail to make a future funding decision. 
The USSP is evaluating numerous IAEA NDA requests, prior to making a funding determination. 
The SSTS indicated interest in the “Upgrade of the Continuous Enrichment Monitoring System 
(CEMO)” and “State of the Art NDA Techniques Applicable to Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) 
Cylinders,” at the 2008 USSP Annual Review Meeting. A meeting to discuss the CEMO request 
with other Member State Support Programs (MSSPs) will be held in July 2008. 
3.1.k Continue support for the development and maintenance of facility specific NDA systems 
The USSP is funding the revision of the Fork Detector Measurement System (FDMS) and Radiation 
Review software codes under task A.252. This software upgrade will enable the IAEA to perfom 
FDMS analysis of spent fuel assembly data collected in unattended mode. The USSP funded the 
production of an inspector documentation package for FDMS. The package includes both a check 
list procedure and reference manual for software and instrumentation. 
3.1.1 Continue manufacturer support for existing NDA hardware and software systems 
The IAEA has accepted the Integrated Inspector Information System (13s) software delivery for the 
USSP funded multi-million dollar software development project for the Rokkasho Reprocessing 
Plant (RRP), under task A.247. The USSP has funded follow on maintenance support for RRP 
under two separate tasks: one for software (subtask A.247.21) and one for hardware (subtask 
A.247.22). This support is needed by the IAEA to troubleshoot issues, as RRP goes into full 
operation. Other ongoing tasks are software and hardware support for UNARM software (subtask 
E.122.15). This task provides the IAEA with technical support. Software issues identified by the 
IAEA are repaired, if possible, in the near term. If the software issue can not be rectified in the near 
term, the software developer documents the issue so it can be addressed in the next software release. 
An UNARM software control board (USCB) is funded under subtask E.122.13. The USCB consists 
of key software development personnel who meet periodically to discuss UNARM software issues. 
The USCB coordinates the required revisions for the next software baseline release. All IAEA 
reported software issues are logged into a program to track their status. 
3.l.m Continue providing professional technical support for NDA hardware and software 
The USSP funds CFE and JPO requests to provide assistance with NDA software and hardware. A 
CFE is providing unattended and integrated monitoring support to the IAEA at present, under task 
A.266. The CFE’s work includes technical assistance with neutron measurement instruments, a 
modem liquid scintillator feasibility study, RRP NDA instruments, and J-MOX measurement 
systems. A CFE is funded to manage and operate the data collection and evaluation of RRP 
software, under task D.172. This assignment involves project management for the RRP and J-MOX 
13s and ensures the seamless transmission, authentication, and analysis of the instrumentation data 
from these facilities. A JPO is providing NDA nuclear physics assistance to the IAEA under task 
A.272. The JPO’s work includes NDA evaluation and improvements to NDA software. 
4. SUMMARY AND FUTURE 
The C/S priority provides guidance to the USSP for the evaluation of MEA requests and for the 
performance of funded tasks. This paper provides a description of the C/S tasks the USSP has 
funded recently to improve the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for 
unattended and remotely monitored use. Each year, the USSP reviews the results of the previous 
year’s priority tactical goals to measure priority performance. The priorities are revised each year 
to address the ever changing needs of the IAEA. The USSP will continue its effort to ensure that 
the IAEA has the tools and expertise necessary to fulfill its important mission. 
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